David Jackson

David Jackson's personal blog. Thoughts on economics, family, running, politics, and culture ….

  • We’ve been here before and nothing broke

    Oil above $100. Hormuz closed. Seems to be a lot of panic. Sounds bad, doesn’t it?

    Just a reminder that from 2010 to 2014, real oil prices were significantly higher than today — and today’s price already reflects a war premium. That elevated period lasted four years, in a more oil-dependent global economy. Nothing broke. In fact, it was a pretty good 4-year period. Certainly those of us in developed economies weren’t living badly in 2014. In fact many people would take 2014 right now. So on the economics of this, I think I am missing something.

    Yes, 20% of global supply transits Hormuz (IEA data). But the obvious counter to this is 80% of supply doesn’t. Oil is tradeable. Barrels can reroute. For example, Russian “sanctioned” oil found buyers rather quickly as far as I can tell.

    I understand there is a problem of refinery configuration, particularly in Asia as they are built for Gulf oil. Not my specialty but it makes sense in economic terms as the product is less interchangeable. I don’t doubt the experts who say this is true, but it must be temporary as it can be solved with investment. Over a reasonable enough time period, almost all energy sources are interchangeable, hence their prices typically correlate.

    Meanwhile oil is only 30% of global primary energy, down from 46% in 1973 (IEA data). Oil intensity per unit of GDP — the amount of oil needed to produce a unit of economic output — has fallen almost every year for 40 years. The world economy is structurally less exposed to an oil shock than at any point in the modern era.

    And then there is the futures market. I understand both WTI and Brent futures markets currently show steep backwardation — meaning traders expect today’s elevated price to fall significantly. Interestingly, and please correct me if you are deep into energy market trading, but I also understand this steep backwardation was not a feature of the 2010 to 2014 period, when high real oil prices were treated more as the new normal. So traders today appear not to be pricing in a permanent high oil price, but I genuinely don’t know why. I can think of three explanations. It could be the market thinks the strait will reopen and the conflict dies down. Or it could be that the market believes other supply sources are cheap and plentiful. Or it could be that the market believes the world’s ability to shift away from oil on the demand side is strong. Or it is a probability-weighted bet on all of these possibilities. The explanations all lead to the same place though: the market, with all available information, is not currently pricing a global catastrophe.

    So why don’t we just walk away? The market will sort it out.

    I think the answer is we probably could, economically, but there are other reasons to persist that aren’t economic. Geopolitical reasons. Gulf allies abandoned, Iranian regime left unchecked, and a regional vacuum that nobody wants filled the way it could be filled.

    Those are legitimate reasons. But they’re different reasons. And I’d rather we argued for them honestly than dressed up as an economic catastrophe.

    So, any energy economics experts out there? Tell me what am I missing? I could be ignorant (often am) but I can’t see the economic case for panic.

  • Mt Iwate from Morioka

    Famous photo spot. Happy with this one. Zoomed in to fill the frame and it looks amazing.

  • Rare? ChatGBT estimates 1940s or 1950s. So could be 70 years old or more.

  • Always reminds me of the movie when I look north towards Surfers Paradise. Amazing view.

  • Artificial intelligence (AI) will fall over

    Interesting short article from Bain. At the demand predictions for use of AI, there is simply not enough capital to keep up.

    Bain’s analysis of sustainable ratios of capex to revenue for cloud service providers suggests that $500 billion of annual capex corresponds to $2 trillion in annual revenue. What could fund this $2 trillion every year? If companies shifted all of their on-premise IT budgets to cloud and also reinvested the savings anticipated from applying AI in sales, marketing, customer support, and R&D (estimated at about 20% of those budgets) into capital spending on new data centers, the amount would still fall $800 billion short of the revenue needed to fund the full investment.

    How Can We Meet AI’s Insatiable Demand for Compute Power? | Bain & Company

    So how will this play out?

    I don’t think AI gently plateaus. I think it will look more like a denial-of-service attach on a website, or trying to get Taylor Swift tickets from Ticketek. The system will groan under the weight of demand, degrade, and then stop.

    In my own life I am using AI about 3 times more than I did 3 months ago. That is 3x more demand. Is that 3x the compute power? If I multiply out my own experience by billions of people, I smell a demand and supply gap of GALACTIC proportions.

    $500 billion in annual spending on new data centres is an extraordinary number. For the AI business model to work, it doesn’t simply have to provide value to people. It needs to provide value IN EXCESS of what it costs to provide that value.

    Unless there is a major break through in the cost of computing power, or the existing computing power is focused very narrowly on those that can pay, I think this whole game has to stop, or at least slow down considerably while we work out how to power it.

  • Population growth “mega-trend”?

    I’m curious about the population growth “megatrend” that is often stated as fact but is highly questionable.

    Between now and 2050, world population is forecast to be 15–20% higher at most. I say “at most” as the UN forecast is continually revised down due to faster-than-expected birth-rate declines.

    Furthermore, even if you accept the forecast, the make-up of population will be very different from today. It will be a much older population in many countries, and current rich economies are forecast to be a much smaller share of the global population. This is because current OECD members will have a flat population at best while Africa grows substantially. Notably, China will substantially shrink.

    The certainty of China shrinking is far greater than the certainty of Africa growing, as the population has already peaked. I think this will have enormous implications for food demand in both directions.

    We like simple “megatrends”, especially for online posts, but under the surface things are always a lot more interesting.

    “Population growth, urbanisation, the infrastructure of decarbonisation, capital stock replacement and rising living standards are expected to drive demand for steel, non–ferrous metals, and fertilisers for decades to come. “ – 2024 BHP Economic and Commodity Outlook

    BHPs economic and commodity outlook

  • My 50th

    I had my 50th party in October (birthday was in September). Not everybody could be there, but it was a good representation of people from various circles who are meaningful to me over 50 years. Thanks to those that shared the night with me! I had a great time. Only one speech allowed (mine) and the recording tells me I spoke for 26 minutes! Thanks all for donations. Raised $3200 for Dementia Australia.